Chinese Amphibious Assault Ships Must Modernize to Counter Taiwan’s Hedge Hog Defense

Photo: China Military Outline

Argument by David Heiner | March 1, 2024

The expansion and modernization of the PLA Navy began in 1990 and it has rapidly developed into the world’s largest navy. With a staggering 370 ships and submarines, one might think that it possesses a massive edge over Taiwan, with its tiny fleet of 93 vessels. However, despite the overwhelming numerical advantage of the PLA Navy, Taiwanese strategy has never relied upon a decisive naval engagement. Taiwan’s “Hedge Hog” strategy relies on low-cost, high-lethality measures to sink as many troop transports as possible; utilizing anti-ship missiles, and rapid assault missile craft to get the job done. Ian Easton, a senior fellow at Project 2049 told U.S. Naval Institute News Taiwan’s strategy “is to build enough missiles and plenty of the launchers, whether they’re fast boats or land-based truck launchers, and make them survivable enough where you can all but guarantee you’re going to be able to sink about half of the Chinese Navy. That’s their goal.” Chinese strategy has relied on a large amphibious lift capacity, capable of delivering 300,000 troops and their equipment in only ten days, relying on civilian shipping to accomplish this. These are exactly the kind of ships vulnerable to this kind of attack due to their lack of defensive armaments and inability to assault beaches, rather than just deliver troops. Therefore, to carry out a successful naval invasion of Taiwan, the PLA Navy should drastically ramp up its production of amphibious assault ships with the proper capabilities to do more than just disgorge troops. Of course, all speculation assumes the United States will not become directly militarily involved in the conflict.

The Age-Old Civilian Shipping Argument

Traditional Chinese Naval planning relies on the assumption that Civilian ships will be able to quickly transport troops to Taiwan. Proponents of this strategy have argued for the capabilities of civilian shipping to narrow the gap since the 1990s, with a Brookings article from 1999 demonstrating that the strategy has not changed. Thomas Shugart, an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security agrees with this strategy. He iterates that Chinese ferries like the Zhong Hua Fu Xing beat out US amphibious assault ships like the San Antonio class in multiple metrics, boasting 65,000 square feet of vehicle storage “more than 2.5 times the San Antonio class” capability to transport 1300 troops and cost 20 times less. While all of this is true, it ignores the true purpose of an amphibious assault ship; supporting, rather than dropping troops onto a beachhead to be slaughtered.

Civilian Shipping Can’t Narrow the Gap, We Need More Naval Assault Ships

Amphibious assault ships, as the name implies, do more than just deliver, and disgorge troops onto a beachhead. The newest PLA Navy vessel the Type 075 landing helicopter dock is equipped with floodable well decks for delivering 60 ZBD-05 Amphibious Infantry Fighting Vehicles, twenty-eight Changhe Z-8 heavy transport and anti-submarine helicopters, can carry 800 troops, two H/PJ-14 30mm Gatling guns for anti-ship missile defense and close target engagement, and two HQ-10 surface to air missiles for anti-aircraft defense. The capability of these ships to sink small coastal craft armed with missiles, amphibious drones, and deter anti-ship missiles is crucial for safely getting troops to the beaches, and then sticking around to provide support. Mike Pietrucha’s article “Amateur Hour Part 1: The Chinese Invasion of Taiwan” acknowledges the capability of civilian shipping to get troops ashore, but states “these ships are next to useless in an assault phase and come into play only if adequate, intact port facilities are captured.” He also points out in his article that the PLA Navy compares poorly to even WWII “Operation Husky”, the invasion of Sicily in 1943. The PLA Navy would have a sixth of the on-call fire support American forces had from auxiliary ships, less carrying capacity, and less experience in operations. It can be argued that modern technology allows for more precise fire and airpower and that the Chinese Navy is already greatly expanding, but efforts to procure more amphibious assault ships have lagged, with only three Type 075 Landing Helicopter Docks completed, and five in construction. In addition, civilian ships and ferries lack dedicated delivery systems. Floodable well docks allow amphibious assault ships to quickly disgorge amphibious infantry fighting vehicles to beaches and knock out missile systems and secure ports, allowing for more troops and heavier armament to be brought in. However, car ferries lack this capability; as seen in a September 28th amphibious exercise where troops “swam to the car ferries and loaded amphibious assault craft aboard at sea via a specially-constructed ramp”.

How to Narrow the Gap

If the PLA Navy hopes to successfully invade Taiwan, thought should be given to more than just the sheer number of ships, troops, and aircraft it can launch at the Taiwanese navy. Historical lessons from amphibious invasions have demonstrated again and again that protection should be assured to troop transports. Preferably, dedicated anti-missile defense systems aboard the transport ships and a massive quantity of force should be brought directly to the beachhead, sustaining the assault and allowing for reinforcements to be delivered. This requires not just an expansion of the “big ships” in the PLA Navy, but a more focused development on amphibious assault craft. Rather than outdated doctrine from the 1990s that relies on civilian shipping to narrow the gap, doctrine should adapt to the Taiwanese hedgehog defense.